I admire Sewell’s attempt to foster a dialogue between history and the social sciences. In my own discipline I have worked to infuse abstract philosophy with real life historical examples and case studies. Granted, my work has been met with much resistance from what Sewell calls the positivists philosophers, but writers much greater than I have proven that such works are valuable and productive (e.g. Michael Walzer and Nicholas Wolterstorff).
I was most intrigued by Sewell’s attempt to infuse the medium of language with kinesthetic meaning (337), which he uses to make sure the ‘game’ portion of ‘language game’ is not ignored. I must admit a certain level of ignorance when it comes to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but I have always felt uncomfortable assigning all meaning to language. Though I do not wish to downplay its importance, one must be careful placing all of one’s “eggs in one basket.” Take the positivists, for instance: in an attempt to reduce everything to something quantifiable/verifiable, the positivists dug their own grave; for positivism itself cannot be verified. If one is amenable to the pessimistic induction in science (i.e. all current scientific “knowledge” will one day be disproved), then it is only wise to try and bridge as many gaps as possible. In this way, one contributes to the development of well-refined epistemologies and understandings of the world. Stated differently, one who is not busy being born, is busy dying.
Late in his book, Sewell points out an important divide between positivists and interpretivists: the positivists’ dislike of the “fuzzy-mindedness” of interpretivists, and the interpretivists’ dislike of the thick-headedness of the positivists, which suggests an impossible epistemic gap (370). Is this gap too great to be overcome? I hope not, because if so, I am afraid I will always be the pariah of my own field, and most likely the pariah of history.
Posted on November 30, 2009
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